I. INTRODUCTION
T he allocation of income between a parent corporation and its subsidiary depends on the price at which goods and services are transferred between the two entities. When the entities operate in different countries, the transfer price determines how much of the income earned by the joint efforts of the two entities is taxed in each country. The determination of the transfer price used for tax purposes is diffi cult in principle and contentious in practice. Pretax income earned by a multinational enterprise differs from worldwide taxable income to the extent that governments use inconsistent transfer prices to allocate income between countries, which can result in double taxation.
Using a model of competitive equilibrium in which all after-tax economic profi ts are driven to zero, we investigate how taxes affect the location and effi ciency of capital investments in the presence of transfer price inconsistency. First, we characterize a fi rm's investment and repatriation decisions when it is subject to a tax system that features worldwide taxation, deferral of domestic taxation of foreign source income until repatriation, and the possibility of double taxation due to inconsistent transfer prices. These features correspond to how the United States currently taxes international income. Second, we show that inconsistent transfer prices can arise when each country tries to maximize its own welfare, even when this causes overall social welfare to decrease. Third, we investigate the effects of harmonizing transfer prices on investment location and effi ciency. Fourth, we explore how transfer price inconsistency changes the effects of U.S. corporate income tax policies such as the level of tax rates, the elimination of deferral of foreign source income, and the taxation of U.S. multinationals using territorial taxation instead of worldwide taxation.
In our model, both countries adhere to the arm's-length standard when determining transfer prices used by related parties. Under the arm's-length standard, the transfer price should be the price at which two unrelated parties engaging in a comparable transaction under comparable circumstances would trade. There are various methods that can be used when applying this principle in practice, including the comparable uncontrolled transaction method, the resale price method, the cost-plus method, the comparable profi t method, and the profi t-split method. Furthermore, how these methods are applied in practice depends both on which transactions between unrelated parties are considered to be most comparable to the related party transaction, and the reliability of the data.
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If when faced with these various methods the two countries would derive the same transfer price, we consider the transfer price rules to be consistent. If the two countries would derive different prices, we consider the transfer price rules to be inconsistent.
Transfer pricing is the top international tax issue to multinationals according to the most recent Ernst & Young survey, conducted in 2007 (Ernst & Young, 2008 , which stresses that "Inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of information, as well as the underlying transfer pricing rules themselves, continue to cause incompatible compliance burdens and risk of double taxation. US taxpayers, for example, are required to include stock-based compensation in the cost base when applying cost-or profi t-based methods, but many other countries do not accept this treatment of stock-based compensation as being consistent with the arm's-length standard."
Mechanisms such as mutual agreement procedures (MAPs) exist to make it possible for a taxpayer to get relief from double taxation. However, in practice the MAP system often fails to provide such relief because governments are not required to resolve the confl ict in a manner that eliminates double taxation (Mortier, 2002) . Therefore, we focus on the case in which transfer price inconsistency results in double taxation, although the model can be easily extended to include the case of undertaxation.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of double taxation due to transfer price inconsistency on production location, repatriation behavior, and social welfare. Maximizing production effi ciency and maximizing aggregate social welfare are equivalent in our model. Production effi ciency is achieved if domestic and foreign investment face the same tax rate, i.e., if capital export neutrality holds. Although effi ciency and capital export neutrality are not equivalent in general (Horst, 1980; Desai and Hines, 2004) , our focus is not on capital export neutrality per se but rather on how transfer price inconsistency and repatriation taxes affect the location and effi ciency of production.
We fi rst derive a fi rm's production and repatriation decisions in a setting that corresponds to the way that the U.S. taxes foreign income. We fi nd that the current tax system can induce the effi cient level of investment, excessive domestic investment, or excessive foreign investment, depending on the tax rates and the extent of transfer price inconsistency. We fi nd that double taxation can arise if each country chooses its transfer price in an effort to maximize its own welfare, even when this decreases aggregate social welfare. However, we also fi nd that countries may choose the same transfer price even though each country is striving to maximize its own welfare. Eliminating double taxation by harmonizing transfer prices either has no effect on investment or increases foreign investment; in the latter case, the shift towards foreign investment could either increase or decrease effi ciency. Finally, we fi nd that the effects of changes in U.S. corporate income tax policies, such as eliminating deferral of taxation of foreign source income or moving to territorial taxation of foreign source income, depend on the extent of transfer price inconsistency.
In the next section, we review the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. We present our model and derive the equilibrium production and repatriation decisions under current U.S. tax law in the third section. In the fourth section, we examine the effects of transfer price inconsistency on social welfare. We also illustrate how inconsistent transfer prices can arise when each country tries to maximize its own welfare. In the fi fth section, we investigate the effects of harmonizing transfer pricing rules on investment location, production effi ciency, and repatriation decisions. We also show conditions under which countries have confl icting interests regarding the choice of a harmonized transfer price, as well as conditions under which their interests are aligned. In the sixth section, we investigate how transfer price inconsistency affects the consequences of other U.S. corporate tax policies. The seventh section concludes.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE
The model we use to investigate the effects of inconsistent transfer pricing rules was developed by Anand and Sansing (2000) in their study of formulary apportionment, the system used by U.S. states and Canadian provinces to allocate taxable income among political jurisdictions. De Waegenaere and Sansing (2009) also use this model to compare separate accounting to formulary apportionment.
Most papers that examine tax transfer pricing rules assume that all political jurisdictions use the same transfer price; however, there are several exceptions. Elitzur and Mintz (1996) study tax competition and tax harmonization in the presence of inconsistent transfer prices. Wielhouwer (2006, 2007) examine inconsistent transfer pricing rules in the context of strategic tax compliance models in which the production decisions preceding the tax compliance decision are taken as fi xed. Unlike these papers, our paper focuses on how inconsistent transfer prices affect production decisions. Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) and De Waegenaere and Sansing (2009) also focus on the production decisions that inconsistent transfer pricing rules induce. Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) examine the effects of transfer price inconsistency on production effi ciency when a fi rm sells to both related and unrelated parties under imperfect competition. They fi nd that inconsistent transfer pricing rules induce production distortions in both markets when the transactions between the unrelated parties affect the transfer price used in the related party transaction. De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008b) focus on the effects of changing from a system of separate accounting with inconsistent transfer prices to formulary apportionment. In contrast to those papers, this paper investigates the effects of transfer price inconsistency as well as transfer price harmonization on the location and effi ciency of production, on repatriation decisions, and on country welfare. It also studies how the effects of other U.S. corporate tax policies depend on the degree of transfer price inconsistency. It does so in a competitive equilibrium without non-tax frictions.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the effect of taxes on repatriation decisions. Hartman (1985) was the fi rst to examine the effect of the U.S. tax system on foreign investment and repatriation decisions. He showed that the U.S. repatriation tax does not distort the decision whether to reinvest foreign earnings in a new foreign project or pay a dividend, because all earnings are reduced by the same repatriation tax rate sooner or later. Rice (1994), Weichenrieder (1996) , and Altshuler and Grubert (2002) extend Hartman's model to consider the role of investment in fi nancial assets by a foreign subsidiary. These papers show that investing in risk-free fi nancial assets costlessly defers the repatriation tax when the parent corporation discounts riskless after-tax cash fl ows using the after-domestic corporate tax risk-free rate. Therefore, in these models, the subsidiary should reinvest earnings on operating assets in the risk-free asset instead of repatriating them to the parent as a dividend. Using Brennan's (1970) after-tax capital asset pricing model, De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008a) argue that the appropriate discount rate should refl ect the average shareholder tax rate and not the domestic corporate tax rate. In their model, investing in the risk-free asset to avoid the repatriation tax involves an opportunity cost to the extent the after-domestic corporate tax interest rate is less than the after-tax discount rate. We use the same approach in this paper; however, we also allow the shareholder tax parameter to equal the corporate tax rate, so the possibility of costless deferral arises in our model as a special case.
In addition to investing in fi nancial assets, there may be other methods to reduce the burden of the repatriation tax. Altshuler and Grubert (2002) , for example, consider the possibility of using riskless after-tax cash fl ows to support additional debt fi nancing by the domestic parent corporation. If a dollar of fi nancial assets held by the foreign subsidiary were to allow the domestic parent to increase the riskless debt in its capital structure by a dollar, the parent would in effect get the use of that dollar without ever paying the repatriation tax. However, Clemons and Kinney (2008) document a substantial response by U.S. multinationals to the temporary 85% reduction in the tax on repatriated foreign earnings enacted as part of The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The willingness of multinationals to pay up to a 5.25 percent tax on repatriated foreign earnings suggests rather strongly that techniques for deferring the repatriation tax, such as those described in Altshuler and Grubert, do not fully eliminate the burden of the repatriation tax. Therefore, even though costless deferral of the repatriation tax is a special case of our model, we explicitly take into account the possibility that deferral is costly.
III. THE MODEL
We study an economy with one good and two countries. Demand for this good is perfectly inelastic. Domestic demand for the good is δ; foreign demand for the good is zero. Because the focus of our study is on how inconsistent transfer prices and tax rates affect the location of production, it is convenient to assume that total demand for (and thus the aggregate equilibrium supply of) the good is fi xed, and focus on where production takes place.
Production can occur in either country, employing a constant returns to scale production technology with a single non-depreciable input that we call capital. One unit of physical capital is needed to produce one unit of output. We assume that some inputs are immobile (it may be useful to think of land or natural resources as being an important component of capital), which implies that each country has its own supply curve. The price per unit of physical capital associated with production in each country is determined by aggregate production in that country (denoted q i ), according to
The supply curve in each country is upward-sloping, and C i (0) = 0. The upward-sloping supply curves imply that the competing use for physical capital varies within each country; the assumption that C i (0) = 0 ensures that some production occurs in each country.
All sales occur in the domestic country. One unit of non-depreciable physical capital is needed to sell one unit. The price per unit of capital associated with sales is K. A fi rm that produces domestically and sells one unit incurs a cost of capital of r[C D (q D ) + K], where r denotes the cost of equity capital invested in physical assets. A foreign subsidiary that produces one unit incurs a cost of capital of rC F (q F ), whereas its domestic parent incurs a cost of capital of rK.
Firms engage in production under conditions of perfect competition, in the sense that each fi rm takes input costs and output prices as given. Each fi rm can produce domestically or in the foreign country. We let p denote the equilibrium price of the good.
A. Taxes
Domestic production is taxed by the domestic government at a rate of τ D < 50% on the domestic pretax accounting income each period, i.e., exclusive of its cost of capital. Therefore, a fi rm that produces domestically and sells one unit has after-tax accounting income of p (1 -τ D ) . The income of p from foreign production is subject to tax by both the foreign and domestic governments. The allocation of income for tax purposes between the two countries depends on the transfer price. We let λ F (λ D ) denote the fraction of income associated with foreign production that according to the transfer price used for tax purposes by the foreign government (domestic government) should be taxed by the foreign government, where
The upper and lower bounds ensure that taxable income in each country is weakly positive. Thus, if a transaction generates one dollar of income, the income taxed by the foreign country is λ F , the income taxed by the domestic country is 1 -λ D , and aggregate taxable income is λ F + 1 -λ D . We let I = λ F / λ D ≥ 1 represent the degree of transfer price inconsistency between the two countries. When I = 1, the transfer prices are consistent; double taxation does not occur because the taxable income in the foreign country is equal to the tax deduction permitted by the domestic government. When I > 1, the taxable income in the foreign country exceeds the tax deduction allowed in the domestic country, causing more than 100 percent of the income from the transaction to be taxed. 3 We let τ F denote the foreign country's corporate income tax rate, and assume that τ F < 50%. Producing one unit in the foreign country generates after-tax domestic accounting income of p(1 -τ D )(1 -λ D ), and after-foreign tax foreign earnings and profi ts of p(λ D -τ F λ F ). 4 The domestic government uses a worldwide tax system, under which all income is subject to tax by the domestic government. However, the domestic tax on foreign source earnings is deferred if the foreign subsidiary retains the earnings instead of repatriating them to the domestic parent as a dividend. In addition, the domestic government allows a credit for foreign taxes, that cannot exceed the domestic tax on foreign source income. We emphasize that the foreign tax, τ F λ F p, depends on the transfer price used by the foreign government; the foreign source income for domestic tax purposes, pλ D , depends on the transfer price used by the domestic government.
Three cases are possible. In the fi rst and second cases, Iτ F < τ D , and the foreign tax is lower than the domestic tax on foreign source income (τ F λ F < τ D λ D ), so that the repatriation of after-foreign tax earnings would trigger a repatriation tax of
The repatriation tax transforms the after-foreign tax earnings of
If the foreign subsidiary repatriates its after-foreign tax earnings, the fi rm's after-tax income equals
However, the foreign subsidiary can instead invest the after-foreign tax earnings p(λ D -τ F λ F ) in bonds that earn the risk-free rate of R, thereby indefi nitely deferring the repatriation tax. 5 The interest is taxed at the domestic rate τ D , of which τ F is collected by the foreign government and τ D -τ F is collected by the domestic government. Because the interest income is taxed immediately under Subpart F, there is no reason to defer repatriation. De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008a) show that Brennan's (1970) aftertax capital asset pricing model implies that the appropriate discount rate to use when determining the present value of the future interest income earned on the after-foreign tax earnings is R(1 -τ S ), where τ S refl ects the average shareholder tax rate on interest; we present their argument for the use of R(1 -τ S ) to discount riskless after-tax cash fl ows in Appendix A. We assume that τ S ≤ τ D . Therefore, when after-foreign tax earnings are invested in fi nancial assets, the present value to the domestic parent of these earnings is (
, and the present value of the future after-tax cash fl ows associated with current sale of one unit equals
Comparing the after-tax payoffs to the domestic parent from (3) and (4) shows that the foreign subsidiary will immediately repatriate earnings if τ F λ F ≥ τ S λ D , i.e., if Iτ F ≥ τ S , and invest in fi nancial assets otherwise. The intuition is as follows. When τ F λ F ≤ τ D λ D , a domestic tax is due upon repatriation. The repatriation tax can be avoided by having the foreign subsidiary invest its after-foreign tax earnings in fi nancial assets. However, there is an opportunity cost associated with investing in fi nancial assets, because τ S ≤ τ D implies that the after-domestic corporate tax return on the bond is weakly lower than the after-tax discount rate for riskless cash fl ows. As long as τ F λ F ≤ τ S λ D , the benefi t of avoiding the repatriation tax exceeds the opportunity cost of investing in fi nancial assets.
In the third case, Iτ F ≥ τ D , so no repatriation tax is due because the foreign tax exceeds the domestic tax on foreign source income (
There is no reason to defer repatriation because τ S ≤ τ D . Therefore, the after-tax accounting profi t from producing one unit in the foreign country is given by
The above analysis shows that, in each case, the after-tax profi t from foreign production is of the form p(1 -T ), where T refl ects the combined effect of foreign and domestic taxes imposed on income generated by foreign production, plus the opportunity cost associated with investment in fi nancial assets. The following proposition summarizes the effect of the tax system, tax rates, and transfer prices on the combined tax rate T imposed on foreign production.
after-foreign tax earnings are repatriated as earned, there is no repatriation tax, so
after-foreign tax earnings are repatriated as earned, the repatriation tax causes all income to be taxed at the domestic country's tax rate, so T = τ D ; (c) if Iτ F < τ S , then the repatriation tax is avoided via investment in fi nancial assets, so
Three effects determine T: the relation between the corporate tax rates τ D and τ F , the relation between the foreign tax rate τ F and the shareholder tax parameter τ S , and the degree of transfer price inconsistency, I. First, suppose there is no transfer price inconsistency, i.e., λ F = λ D , and so I = 1. If τ F > τ D , then T > τ D because the foreign tax on foreign income exceeds the domestic tax on foreign income; repatriation occurs tax-free in this case. Now consider the case in which a repatriation tax is due upon repatriation because τ F < τ D . If τ F < τ S , then T < τ D , because then the opportunity cost associated with investing foreign earnings in fi nancial assets instead of repatriating them is lower than the repatriation tax. If instead τ S ≤ τ F , then T = τ D because then the cost of avoiding the repatriation tax is too high, and so all income is repatriated. Note that when a repatriation tax is due upon repatriation, the condition that determines whether income is repatriated or invested in foreign assets depends on τ F and τ S , and does not involve τ D . This occurs because repatriating one dollar of after-foreign tax earnings yields an after-repatriation tax cash fl ow of (1 -τ D )/(1 -τ F ), whereas reinvesting that same dollar in fi nancial assets and repatriating the interest yields an after-repatriation tax perpetual cash fl ow of R(1 -τ D ) dollars that has a present value of (1 -τ D )/(1 -τ S ) dollars.
To illustrate the effect of transfer price inconsistency on the tax rate imposed on foreign production, consider the case in which T = τ D and transfer prices are consistent, i.e., τ S < τ F < τ D . Then, transfer price inconsistency can imply that T is greater than, equal to, or less than τ D . Specifi cally, T > τ D if transfer price inconsistency is suffi ciently high
Finally, we consider the special case in which τ S = τ D , which implies that the repatriation tax can be costlessly avoided. Parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 1 characterize all of the possible outcomes except in the knife-edge case for which Iτ F = τ D . If Iτ F > τ D , then Proposition 1(a) applies. Foreign taxes paid on foreign earnings exceed the U.S. tax on foreign earnings, so repatriation occurs tax-free. If Iτ F < τ D , then Proposition 1(c) applies. Because τ S = τ D , the corporation earns the same after-tax rate of interest as do the shareholders, R(1 -τ D ), and thus there is no opportunity cost associated with retaining after-foreign tax earnings in the subsidiary. In that case,
B. Equilibrium
We defi ne a competitive equilibrium to be an output price p and aggregate output quantities q D and q F at which both domestic and foreign production earns zero after-tax economic profi ts. For domestic production, this requires
The equilibrium condition for foreign production is given by
where the combined tax rate imposed on foreign production, T, depends on the subsidiary's repatriation tax and repatriation strategy, as given in Proposition 1. In addition, total output must equal demand, so
The equilibrium price and quantities follow from solving the set of (6)-(8). The equilibrium price is given by
and the equilibrium production quantities q D and q F are given by
We assume that K is suffi ciently small to ensure that all prices and quantities are positive. Specifi cally, we assume that
It follows from (10) that the effects of the tax system, tax rates, and transfer prices on equilibrium production decisions are determined by
, the ratio of the after-tax accounting profi t from foreign production to the after-tax accounting profi t from domestic production. The fraction of demand satisfi ed by domestic production is strictly decreasing in Π.
The extent of transfer price inconsistency I affects the ratio Π through its effect on T, as described in Proposition 1. Depending on tax rates and transfer prices, the after-tax accounting profi t from foreign production can be either higher or lower than the aftertax accounting profi t from domestic production. When transfer price inconsistency is high, Iτ F > τ D , Proposition 1(a) shows that T > τ D , and so Π < 1. When transfer price inconsistency is moderate, τ S ≤ Iτ F ≤ τ D , Proposition 1(b) shows that T = τ D , so that Π = 1. When transfer price inconsistency is low, Iτ F < τ S , Proposition 1(c) shows that T < τ D , so that Π > 1 in this case.
IV. WELFARE ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the effects of transfer price inconsistency on aggregate social welfare. We also examine the incentives of countries to choose inconsistent transfer prices in an attempt to maximize their own welfare.
A. Aggregate Social Welfare
Aggregate social welfare, W, is composed of three elements -the surplus received by consumers, the surplus received by capital owners in the two countries, and the taxes collected by the two governments. Because both domestic and foreign corporations earn zero economic profi ts, neither double taxation nor transfer price harmonization affect their payoffs. Consumer surplus is δ (B -p) 
Rewriting (12) using (6), (7), and (8), yields
Because the cost of selling δ units, rδK, does not depend on where production occurs, maximizing social welfare is equivalent to minimizing the social cost of production. The pair (q D , q F ) that minimizes the cost of producing δ units solves the cost minimization problem
the solution to which is
Comparing (10) to (14) shows that production is effi cient if T = τ D , ineffi cient with excess production in the domestic country if T > τ D , and ineffi cient with excess production in the foreign country if T < τ D . Therefore, our model refl ects capital export neutrality in that production effi ciency is achieved if and only if domestic and foreign investment face the same tax rate.
The extent of transfer price inconsistency I affects effi ciency through its effect on T. We summarize the effects of transfer price inconsistency on the location and effi ciency of production in Proposition 2. (c) when transfer price inconsistency is low, Iτ F < τ S , production is ineffi cient with excessive foreign investment.
The proof is in Appendix B.
B. Country Level Welfare
The analysis in the preceding subsection took the transfer prices λ F and λ D as given. In this subsection, we examine the incentives for the governments of the two countries to choose different transfer prices, as each strives to maximize its own welfare. We consider the case in which the two countries are constrained in their choice of transfer price by the arm's-length standard. We let λ A denote the transfer price that is the midpoint of a range of transfer prices, [λ A -ε, λ A + ε], where ε is arbitrarily small, each of which satisfi es the arm's-length standard. We ask which transfer price from this interval each country would choose.
We fi rst defi ne the welfare of each country. For purposes of expositional convenience, we consider the case α D = α F = α. Because all consumption takes place in country D, consumer surplus δ(B -p) is part of country D′s welfare. The surplus to capital owners in country i ∈{F, D} is rαq i 2 /2. Tax collections by the two countries depend on whether the pretax profi t of foreign production is subject to repatriation tax, and, if so, whether the income is repatriated or reinvested in fi nancial assets. We illustrate the economic forces that lead to double taxation in the case in which τ F > τ D .
7 Then, for any given,
and it follows from Proposition 1(a) that all after-foreign tax earnings are repatriated tax-free. Therefore, the tax revenue of country F is given by τ F λ F pq F , and the tax revenue of country D is given
Adding the three components of welfare shows that the welfare of country F, W F , is given by
and the welfare of country D, W D , is given by
Proposition 3 characterizes the Nash equilibrium that arises when each country noncooperatively chooses its transfer price from the interval [λ A -ε, λ A + ε] in an effort to maximize its own welfare.
Proposition 3
Country D always chooses λ D = λ A -ε. There is a critical value δ * for which country
The proof is in Appendix B. Country D always chooses the lowest transfer price. In contrast, country F chooses the lowest transfer price when δ is suffi ciently low, and the highest transfer price when δ is suffi ciently high. An increase in λ F affects country F's welfare both directly and indirectly through its effect on q F , the equilibrium amount of production located in the foreign country, and on p, the equilibrium output price. Differentiating W F with respect to λ F yields:
The fi rst term refl ects the direct effect of an increase in λ F on country F's tax revenues, taking investment decisions and the equilibrium output price p as fi xed. The second term refl ects the indirect effect on tax revenues through the effect of λ F on p. It is positive because an increase in λ F increases the equilibrium output price p (i.e., ∂p/∂λ F > 0). The third and fourth terms refl ect the indirect effect on producer surplus and tax revenues, respectively, through the effect of λ F on the production quantity q F . These two effects are negative because an increase in λ F decreases q F (i.e., ∂q F /∂λ F < 0). We consider how the aggregate of these four effects depends on δ, the demand for the output. When δ is close to its lower bound of K(T -τ D )/(α(1 -T)), then q F is close to zero and the fi rst three terms are also close to zero. In that case, the dominant effect of an increase in λ F on country F's welfare is the reduction in F's tax revenues due to a decrease in q F . A higher demand for output induces both a higher equilibrium price and a higher production quantity (i.e., ∂p/∂δ > 0, ∂q F / ∂δ > 0). Moreover, an increase in λ F affects the equilibrium price and the production quantity more strongly when aggregate demand is higher, (i.e., ∂ 2 p/∂λ F ∂δ > 0, and ∂ 2 q F /∂λ F ∂δ < 0). Therefore, the fi rst two effects become more positive and the last two effects become more negative as δ increases. However, the net effect is positive; when δ becomes suffi ciently large, an increase in λ F increases country F's welfare.
Therefore, when δ < δ * , both D and F choose the lowest transfer price within a small interval of arm's-length prices. When δ > δ * , then within the interval of arm's-length prices, country F would choose the highest price. In combination with country D's incentive to choose the lowest price, double taxation arises in this setting. We emphasize that in this case, the equilibrium choices of the two governments minimize aggregate social welfare. This occurs because the equilibrium transfer prices maximize the difference between the tax rate τ D imposed on domestic production and the tax rate T imposed on foreign production.
V. HARMONIZING TRANSFER PRICES
In this section, we investigate the effects of harmonizing transfer pricing rules on production decisions, production effi ciency, and repatriation behavior. We consider a setting in which transfer price inconsistency is eliminated. Specifi cally, both countries agree that the fraction of foreign income allocated to the foreign country is given by
We use Proposition 1 to determine the combined tax rate imposed on foreign production in case of consistent and in case of inconsistent transfer prices, respectively, and then compare (10) to (14) in both cases to investigate the effect of harmonizing transfer prices on production location, production effi ciency, and repatriation decisions. Finally, we examine each country's preferences regarding which single harmonized transfer price should be used.
A. Eff ects of Harmonization on Firm Decisions and Social Welfare
It follows from Proposition 1 that with harmonized transfer prices (i.e., I = 1), the combined tax rate imposed on foreign production depends on the tax rates, τ F , τ D , and τ S .
With inconsistent transfer prices, production decisions also depend on the degree of transfer price inconsistency, I. We summarize the effect of transfer price harmonization on the location and effi ciency of production in Table 1 ; the derivations of these results are in Appendix C.
Harmonization increases foreign production when foreign income is heavily taxed relative to domestic income (Iτ F > τ D ). Harmonization also increases foreign production when foreign income is lightly taxed relative to domestic income (Iτ F ≤ τ D ) and the opportunity cost of deferring the repatriation tax by having the foreign subsidiary invest in fi nancial assets is suffi ciently low (τ S > τ F ). When foreign income is lightly taxed relative to domestic income, but the opportunity cost of deferring the repatriation tax by having the foreign subsidiary invest in fi nancial assets is suffi ciently high (τ S ≤ τ F ), harmonization has no effect on the location of production.
Transfer price harmonization has ambiguous effects on production effi ciency. When foreign income is heavily taxed, harmonization increases effi ciency if τ F ≥ τ S by bringing the combined tax rate on foreign income closer to the domestic tax rate. When τ F < τ S , however, harmonization brings the combined tax rate on foreign income down below the domestic tax rate, yielding excessive foreign investment; this induces a shift from ineffi ciently high to ineffi ciently low domestic production. The overall effect of harmonization could increase or decrease effi ciency in that case. When foreign income is lightly taxed, harmonization decreases effi ciency if τ S > τ F and has no effect if τ F ≥ τ S .
Finally, transfer price harmonization affects the foreign subsidiary's repatriation decision when τ F < τ S ≤ Iτ F . When transfer price inconsistency is suffi ciently high, the subsidiary should repatriate its after-foreign tax earnings to the foreign parent. Harmonizing transfer prices induces the subsidiary to instead reinvest these earnings in fi nancial assets.
B. Country Preferences Regarding Harmonization
In the preceding subsection, we assumed tax harmonization has occurred and considered the effects of harmonization on investment and repatriation strategies. In this subsection, we illustrate the confl icts that can arise between governments regarding the choice of a harmonized transfer price λ H in the case τ F > τ D . Specifi cally, we fi nd each country's preferred value of λ H if they are constrained to a range of arm's length 
VI. OTHER U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX POLICIES
In this section, we use Proposition 1 to investigate how transfer price inconsistency affects the consequences of other U.S. corporate income tax policies. Our results indicate that the degree of transfer price inconsistency can alter the effects of tax policy changes; ignoring the infl uence of transfer price inconsistency can yield suboptimal policy choices. We examine the effect of lowering the corporate tax rate, eliminating the deferral of foreign source income from U.S. taxation, and changing to a system of territorial taxation instead of worldwide taxation of foreign source income.
A. Cutting the Domestic Corporate Income Tax Rate
The fi rst U.S. tax policy change we examine is lowering the corporate statutory tax rate τ D . The U.S. currently has one of the highest tax rates among OECD nations, which as we have seen can induce excessive foreign investment. We analyze the effect of a small decrease in τ D on the location and effi ciency of investment. A change in the domestic tax rate affects both the tax rate on domestic production and the combined tax rate T on foreign production. It follows from (10) that the effect of a change in the domestic tax rate on equilibrium production decisions depends on how it affects the ratio of the after-tax profi t from foreign production to the after-tax profi t from domestic production, Π = (1 -T)/(1 -τ D ). A change in τ D increases the fraction of demand satisfi ed by domestic production if it decreases Π. It follows from (10) and (14) that a change in τ D increases effi ciency if it moves the ratio Π closer to one. We emphasize that effects on production location and production effi ciency depend on Π, and not on the difference between the tax rates T and τ D .
We summarize the results of decreasing the domestic corporate tax rate τ D in Table  2 . The derivations of these results are in Appendix C.
If foreign income is heavily taxed relative to domestic income (Iτ F > τ D ), decreasing τ D increases effi ciency if transfer price inconsistency is very high (Iτ F > 1) and decreases effi ciency otherwise (Iτ F < 1). If foreign income is lightly taxed relative to domestic income (Iτ F ≤ τ D ), decreasing τ D has no effect on the location of investment and no effect on production effi ciency.
Transfer price inconsistency makes it more likely that a decrease in the domestic tax rate would increase effi ciency. A decrease in the domestic tax rate increases effi ciency when Iτ F > 1. The greater the level of transfer price inconsistency I, the more likely it is that this condition is satisfi ed.
B. Eliminating Deferral of Foreign Source Income
Next, we examine the effect of subjecting foreign source income to U.S. tax when it is earned, instead of waiting until it is repatriated from a foreign subsidiary. Eliminating deferral only changes the analysis in Proposition 1(c), increasing the tax rate T on foreign investment to τ D . This tax change would increase domestic investment and increase effi ciency by removing the tax advantage associated with investing in foreign countries with tax rates lower than the U.S. rate. In addition, eliminating deferral would induce the foreign subsidiary to repatriate after-foreign tax earnings instead of investing in fi nancial assets so as to avoid the repatriation tax. We summarize these results in Table 3 ; the derivations of these results are Appendix C. Transfer price inconsistency makes the effi ciency gains from eliminating deferral less likely to occur. Eliminating deferral only enhances effi ciency when τ S > Iτ F ; the greater the transfer price inconsistency, the less likely it is for this condition to be satisfi ed.
C. Adopting Territorial Taxation
Finally, we examine the consequences of the domestic government adopting a territorial tax regime for the location and effi ciency of production, as well as repatriation decisions. We summarize the results in Table 4 ; the derivations of these results are in Appendix C.
If the worldwide tax system heavily taxes foreign income relative to domestic income (Iτ F > τ D ), switching to territorial taxation has no effect on production decisions or efficiency. If the worldwide tax system lightly taxes foreign income relative to domestic income (Iτ F < τ D ), switching to territorial taxation would increase foreign investment and decrease production effi ciency. Moreover, if Iτ F < τ S , then a switch to territorial taxation would induce the subsidiary to repatriate after-foreign tax earnings instead of investing in fi nancial assets. If Iτ F ≥ τ S , then a switch to territorial taxation has no effect on the repatriation strategy.
Transfer price inconsistency makes it less likely that a switch to territorial taxation would decrease domestic investment and decrease effi ciency. Adopting territorial taxation only changes production decisions when Iτ F < τ D . The greater the level of transfer price inconsistency I, the less likely it is that this condition is satisfi ed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the effects of inconsistent transfer prices on multinational fi rm decisions and government corporate tax policies. Firm decisions are affected by the domestic tax rate, the foreign tax rate, the transfer price used by each country, and a parameter that refl ects the average shareholder tax rate on interest. The average shareholder tax rate on interest affects the opportunity cost of deferring the repatriation tax by reinvesting in fi nancial assets.
Transfer price inconsistency can affect the location and effi ciency of investment through its effect on the combined foreign and domestic tax rate on foreign income. If this combined tax rate exceeds the domestic tax rate, there is excessive domestic We show conditions under which transfer price inconsistency arises if each country chooses its transfer price non-cooperatively in an attempt to maximize its own welfare, even if doing so would decrease aggregate social welfare. We also show conditions under which the countries choose the same transfer price, even though each strives to maximize its own welfare.
Harmonizing transfer prices weakly increase foreign investment, which has ambiguous effects on effi ciency. Transfer price harmonization also weakly increases the incentive to invest after-foreign tax earnings in fi nancial assets so as to avoid the repatriation tax. Countries may, but need not, disagree over which harmonized transfer price to choose from within a range of prices that satisfy the arm's-length standard.
Finally, the effects of other U.S. tax policies depend on the extent of transfer price inconsistency. A reduction in the domestic tax rate increases effi ciency if the level of double taxation due to transfer price inconsistency is low, but decreases effi ciency if it is high. Eliminating deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign source income increases efficiency if transfer price inconsistency is suffi ciently low, but has no effect otherwise. Switching from the worldwide system of taxing foreign income to a territorial system decreases effi ciency if transfer price inconsistency is low, but has no effect otherwise.
APPENDIX A
We consider a model with M + N risk-averse investors who can invest in either a riskless bond or a risky stock. The riskless bond pays interest at the rate R on each date in perpetuity. The stock generates a risky return x ῀ on each date in perpetuity. The risky return is normally distributed with a mean of μ and a variance of σ 2 . The investors are of two types: taxable and tax-exempt. There are M taxable investors that face a constant statutory tax rate τ B on interest from the bond and a constant effective tax rate τ G on the stock return. The effective tax rate τ G can be lower than the statutory rate on realized capital gains because the tax on unrealized gains is deferred until the stock is sold, and tax may be avoided altogether through a charitable gift of the stock, or through a basis step-up upon the investor's death. The remaining N investors are tax-exempt.
Each investor has a utility function defi ned over end-of period wealth of the form U(w) = -e -ρw . This utility function has the property that if w ῀ is normally distributed with mean μ and variance σ 2 , the investor's certainty equivalent is equal to μ -( ρσ 2 /2). We normalize the number of shares outstanding for the stock to be one.
An equilibrium is defi ned as a portfolio for each investor that maximizes that investor's expected utility given the stock price, and a stock price at which supply equals demand. Each of the M taxable investors buys s T shares at a price of P per share to solve the following maximization problem
Differentiation yields the following fi rst-order condition for each of the M taxable investors
Substituting each investor's demand into the market clearing condition and solving for P yields the equilibrium stock price
We determine the appropriate discount rate for riskless cash fl ows by fi nding the discount rate r f for which Δμ/r f = ΔP, because an increase in μ with no corresponding increase in σ 2 represents an increase in riskless cash fl ows. Therefore, r f = 1/[∂P/∂μ]. Differentiating P with respect to μ and solving for r f yields
Finally, we express the discount rate as r f = R(1 -τ S ) to highlight the relation between investor tax rates and the appropriate discount rate. Solving for τ S yields
, the average shareholder tax rate on interest; when τ G > 0,τ S < Mτ B /(M + N). Suffi cient conditions for the discount rate R(1 -τ D ) to be normatively appropriate in our model, would be N = 0, τ G = 0, and τ B = τ D . In other words, no tax-exempt investors own stock, taxable investors face a tax rate on bond interest equal to the domestic corporate tax rate, and taxable investors face a zero effective tax rate on accrued capital gains.
APPENDIX B B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
When Iτ F > τ D , Proposition 1(a) shows that T > τ D . Therefore, (10) and (14) imply that production is ineffi cient with excessive domestic investment. When τ S ≤ Iτ F ≤ τ D , Proposition 1(b) shows that T = τ D , and so production is effi cient. When Iτ F < τ S , Proposition 1(c) shows that T < τ D . Therefore, production is ineffi cient with excessive foreign investment.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We fi rst show that, for any
Specifi cally, we show that for ε suffi ciently small,
Take ε = 0. Then, substituting the equilibrium values of p, q D , and q F from (9) and (10), with T as in Proposition 1(a), into W D from (16), and differentiating with respect to λ D yields
We now show that the right-hand side of (B1) is negative. Because it is linear in K, it is negative for all K if it is negative for both the upper and lower bounds of K. Because T > τ D , it follows from (11) that the upper bound for K is given by:
Substituting this upper bound into the right-hand side of (B1) and simplifying shows that the right-hand side evaluated at K max is equal to
The lower bound of K is zero. Substituting K = 0 into the right-hand side of (B1) and simplifying yields
This expression is strictly concave in λ A and has a maximum value of zero at λ A = (1 -τ D )/τ F > 1. Therefore, we can conclude that the right-hand side of (B3) is negative, so that for ε suffi ciently small, country D will choose λ A -ε. Next, we consider the incentives of country F, given that country D chooses λ D = λ A -ε. We show that (15), and differentiating yields
Both terms in square brackets are positive because we have assumed τ F > τ D . Therefore,
. − Therefore, for ε suffi ciently small, there exists a δ * (close to δ) such that country F would choose λ A + ε if δ > δ * , and would choose λ A -ε if δ < δ * .
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Setting λ D = λ F = λ H and differentiating W F from (15) with respect to λ H shows that there is a unique maximum at
Setting λ D = λ F = λ H and differentiating W D from (16) with respect to λ H shows that there is a unique minimum at
The result follows from the fact that τ F > τ D implies λ _ < λ -. Table 1 We let T H (T ) denote the combined tax rate imposed on foreign production in case of consistent (inconsistent) transfer prices. We use Proposition 1 to determine T and T H , and then compare (10) to (14) for both T and T H to investigate the effect of harmonizing transfer prices on production location and production effi ciency. Six cases are possible.
APPENDIX C C.1 Derivation of Results in
Case 1: τ F > τ D . The foreign tax on foreign income exceeds the domestic tax on foreign income in case of either consistent or inconsistent transfer prices. Proposition 1 shows that
Output is ineffi cient with excessive domestic production in both cases.
Because harmonization decreases both the foreign and domestic tax on foreign income and there is no repatriation tax, harmonization decreases the combined tax imposed on foreign production. Therefore, harmonizing transfer prices increases foreign production and increases effi ciency in this case. Because all after-foreign tax earnings are repatriated for both inconsistent and harmonized transfer prices, transfer price harmonization has no effect on the fi rm's repatriation strategy in this case.
Case 2: τ S ≤ τ F ≤ τ D and τ D < Iτ F . Under inconsistent transfer prices, the foreign tax on foreign income exceeds the domestic tax; the opposite holds under consistent transfer prices. When transfer prices are inconsistent, Proposition 1(a) shows that T > τ D , and so production is ineffi cient with excessive domestic production. If transfer prices are harmonized, I = 1, and Proposition 1(b) shows that T H = τ D , which implies that the effi cient level of production is achieved. So in this case, harmonizing transfer prices increases foreign production and yields the effi cient outcome. Transfer price harmonization has no effect on the fi rm's repatriation strategy in this case.
Case 3: τ F < τ S and τ D < Iτ F . As in Case 2, harmonization brings the foreign tax on foreign income down from above the domestic tax to below the domestic tax. However, Proposition 1(c) with harmonized transfer prices now implies that deferring the repatriation tax through investment in fi nancial assets is optimal. Therefore, although T > τ D , harmonization implies that T H < τ D . So in this case, harmonizing transfer prices increases foreign production, inducing a shift from ineffi cient excessive domestic production to ineffi cient excessive foreign production. The overall effect on effi ciency is ambiguous. In addition, harmonizing transfer prices changes the fi rm's repatriation strategy from one in which all after-foreign tax earnings are repatriated to one in which these earnings are reinvested by the foreign subsidiary in fi nancial assets.
Case 4:
In this case, the foreign tax on foreign income is lower than the domestic tax, even with inconsistent transfer prices. Proposition 1(b) shows that with either consistent or inconsistent transfer prices, immediately repatriating income is preferred to investing in fi nancial assets, so T = τ D and T H = τ D . Production effi ciency is achieved in both cases, and harmonizing transfer prices has no effect on either production decisions or repatriation behavior.
Case 5: τ F < τ S and τ S ≤ Iτ F ≤ τ D . As in Case 4, the foreign tax on foreign income is lower than the domestic tax, even under inconsistent transfer prices. However, in this case the repatriation strategy is affected by harmonization. It follows from Proposition 1(b) that when transfer prices are inconsistent, it is optimal to immediately repatriate income, yielding T = τ D . It follows from Proposition 1(c) that under harmonized transfer prices, it is optimal to avoid the repatriation tax through investment in fi nancial assets, yielding T H < τ D , which induces excessive foreign production. Therefore, harmonizing transfer prices increases foreign production and reduces effi ciency in this case. It also causes the foreign subsidiary to switch from a strategy of repatriating afterforeign tax earnings to one in which these earnings are invested in fi nancial assets.
Case 6: τ F < τ S and Iτ F < τ S . In this case, Proposition 1(c) shows that avoiding the repatriation tax by investing in fi nancial assets is optimal both under inconsistent transfer prices and under harmonized transfer prices. Specifi cally,
In both cases, production is ineffi cient with excessive foreign production. Subtracting T from T H shows that
Therefore, transfer price harmonization induces greater foreign investment, decreases effi ciency, and has no effect on repatriation strategy in this case. Table 2 We consider two cases. If Iτ F > τ D , then Proposition 1(a) implies that
C.2 Derivation of Results in
Therefore, foreign production has a lower after-tax profi t than domestic production, and thus Π < 1. Differentiating Π with respect to τ D yields
which could be positive or negative, depending on whether Iτ F > 1 or Iτ F < 1. If Iτ F > 1, then ∂Π/∂τ D < 0, so decreasing the domestic corporate tax rate increases Π, thereby increasing foreign investment and increasing effi ciency. If Iτ F < 1, then ∂Π/∂τ D > 0, and so decreasing the domestic corporate tax rate decreases Π, thereby increasing domestic investment and decreasing effi ciency. Therefore, the effect of a tax rate decrease depends on the level of transfer price inconsistency. In contrast, a small decrease in τ D has no effect on production decisions if Iτ F ≤ τ D . Indeed, if τ S ≤ Iτ F ≤ τ D or Iτ F < τ S , then parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 imply that the ratio Π of after-tax profi ts of foreign and domestic production is independent of τ D . Therefore, a change in τ D has no effect on production decisions in these cases. If τ S ≤ Iτ F ≤ τ D , a change in τ D has no effect because the repatriation tax implies that foreign income and domestic income are taxed at the same tax rate. If Iτ F < τ S , a change in τ D has no effect because both the income that is allocated to the domestic parent when it is earned (p (1 -λ D ) ) and the interest from after-foreign tax foreign earnings (R(λ D -τ F λ F )) face a tax rate of τ D . Table 4 We denote T TER for the combined tax rate on foreign income under a territorial system. If the domestic government uses a territorial system, there is no repatriation tax. As was the case in Proposition 1(a), the combined tax rate on foreign income is
C.3 Derivation of Results in
We distinguish three cases to examine the effects of adopting territorial taxation.
Case 1: Iτ F > τ D . This implies λ F τ F > λ D τ D , and thus no repatriation tax is due under either system because the foreign taxes paid are higher than the U.S. tax on foreign source income under both territorial and worldwide tax systems. Therefore, adopting territorial taxation would have no effect on production decisions or on repatriation decisions.
Case 2: τ S ≤ Iτ F ≤ τ D . This implies λ F τ F ≤ λ D τ D , so the foreign taxes paid are lower than the U.S. tax on foreign source income. Because under a territorial tax system no repatriation tax is due, it follows from (C5) that T TER ≤ τ D . Proposition 1(b) shows that under a worldwide system, the repatriation tax causes all income to be taxed at the domestic country's tax rate. Therefore, (C6) T TER ≤ T = τ D , and so switching to a territorial system would increase foreign production and decrease effi ciency. Switching to territorial taxation would have no effect on repatriation decisions in this case.
Case 3: Iτ F < τ S . Because τ S ≤ τ D , it follows that λ F τ F ≤ λ D τ D . Therefore, as in Case 2 it holds that T TER ≤ τ D . However, in this case Proposition 1(c) implies that under a worldwide system the repatriation tax is avoided through investment in fi nancial assets, which yields T < τ D . Subtracting T from T TER yields
Foreign investment is ineffi ciently high under both systems, but is higher under territorial taxation than under worldwide taxation. Therefore, a switch to territorial taxation would increase foreign investment and decrease production effi ciency. In addition, moving to territorial taxation would induce the subsidiary to repatriate after-foreign tax earnings instead of investing in fi nancial assets.
